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The Open Society and Its Enemies:  
An attack against CEU, academic freedom and 
the rule of law 
Petra Bárd 
Abstract 
On 4 April 2017, the Hungarian Parliament adopted amendments to the country’s Act CCIV of 
2011 on National Higher Education, in an attempt to force the Central European University 
(CEU) out of the country. The attack on CEU, based in Budapest and accredited by the Middle 
States Commission on Higher Education, fits into a broader picture of violated academic 
freedoms and an even broader one of a state in constitutional capture, in which fundamental 
rights in general are in jeopardy. This paper explores the controversial law, explains its biased 
nature targeting CEU only, provides possible reasons why the government wishes to shut down 
Hungary’s most prestigious university, describes how political support for the crusade against 
CEU was generated by the government, draws lessons to be learned and suggests desirable 
European responses. The paper argues that the EU’s approach of ‘keeping problem children in 
the family’ has proved to be dysfunctional in recent years. The argument that EU action to 
sanction a member state – e.g. by triggering Article 7 TEU – might have the opposite effect or 
be exploited by those wishing to arouse anti-EU sentiments is not convincing either. Brussels 
has already been blamed for a plethora of ills, and stepping out of the EU will be on Hungary’s 
agenda in any event once the country ceases to be a net beneficiary. The government is already 
paving the way for this move by fostering pro-secession sentiments. The paper argues that 
backsliding by a member state in the rule of law is a European matter and that European 
institutions must react accordingly by employing diplomatic and legal sanctions against any 
country undermining the EU’s foundational values. Instead of watching an autocratic regime 
reinforce itself with EU money, they should make use of all available instruments, including the 
power of the purse – which is seemingly the only convincing tool available for disciplining an 
illiberal government of a net beneficiary country.  
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The Open Society and Its Enemies 
An attack against CEU, academic freedom and the rule of law 
CEPS Policy Insights No. 2017/14, April 2017 
Petra Bárd 
Introduction 
On 4 April 2017, the Hungarian Parliament adopted a law (technically an amendment to Act 
CCIV of 2011 on National Higher Education, see Bill T/14686) in an attempt to force the 
Budapest-based Central European University (CEU), the highest-ranked Hungarian university, 
out of the country. The attack on CEU fits into a broader picture of putting academic freedom 
in jeopardy, and a broader one of a state in constitutional capture, where fundamental rights 
in general are under threat and where state institutions have a limited or no capability of 
effectively remedying infringements of democratic rights. 
This paper explores what the law amending to the act on higher education entails, explains its 
biased nature, i.e. the ways it is targeting CEU and CEU only; provides possible reasons as to 
why the government wishes to shut down Hungary’s most prestigious university; explains how 
political support for the crusade against CEU was generated by the government; and explores 
what the future might hold in terms of lessons to be learned and desirable European responses. 
1. WHAT? The facts of the case against the Central European University 
1.1 Amended rules for foreign-accredited universities and their consequences for CEU 
So what have been the legal tools employed by the Hungarian government? The Central 
European University (CEU) was founded by philanthropist and investor George Soros in 1991. 
It consists of two legal entities: CEU – accredited in the US by the Middle States Commission on 
Higher Education – and Közép-Európai Egyetem (meaning Central European University in 
Hungarian) – a private university accredited in Hungary. Both schools are located in Budapest. 
Upon graduation, all students are awarded a CEU diploma, and some of them also receive a 
Hungarian one, if two conditions are met: i) their programme is accredited in Hungary and ii) 
they comply with extra academic requirements –. The Hungarian degree is automatically 
recognised by all EU member states, and the US degree is also easily nostrified, i.e. to receive 
formal recognition, by all democratic states of the world.  
The new law introduces a number of elements that make the operation of CEU in Hungary 
difficult, if not impossible in the future.  
The first requirement is that a foreign university will be able to function in Hungary, effective 
September 2017, only if its operation is backed up by an intergovernmental agreement 
between Hungary and the respective country in which the program is accredited. Universities 
accredited in the EU/EEA are exempted. In case of federal countries, such as the US, a 
preliminary agreement needs to be concluded with the federal government to be followed by 
a treaty with a state. A second requirement is that foreign universities need to be physically 
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present and offer programmes in the country in which they are accredited. Third, in a reversal 
of the previous practice, employment contracts must henceforth be concluded with all visiting 
professors at foreign universities, who had previously been exempted from such a requirement 
as most of them reside in Hungary for brief periods only.  
Let us consider what the new rules mean for CEU. The third requirement can be complied with 
fairly easily: it will be a huge administrative burden with the many foreign professors, but 
concluding employment contracts is certainly manageable. The second requirement, i.e. to 
establish a Hungarian university in the US goes against the principal motivation behind the 
founding of CEU, which was to bring American educational methodology and scientific 
knowledge from leading universities to Central and Eastern Europe. It would also be extremely 
costly and time-consuming to establish educational facilities in the US and would make little 
sense in an already crowded educational landscape.  
But it is the first requirement that is the most objectionable. The law makes the operation of 
an American university dependent on a factor outside the reach of the university itself. The 
decision whether it could continue its operations in Hungary and under what conditions will be 
at the political discretion of the two country’s leaders, Donald Trump and Viktor Orbán. 
Allegedly, the Hungarian government has already started negotiations with the US, but CEU 
leadership has not yet been informed. It is worrying that a decision is being made over the 
heads of CEU representatives, as if the university was a kind of ‘good’, subject to an 
international trade agreement.  
Making the fate of CEU dependent on the exclusive political discretion of two governments – 
one being openly hostile to CEU – is a clear violation of academic freedom. What is worse, the 
first requirement is impossible to comply with in the US context, where education is a state 
power, and therefore President Trump, even with the best of intentions, could not make a 
decision on the issue, or would be acting ultra vires (outside his authority) if he did so.  
Politicians in favour of the law argued that it was neutral, contending that the Education 
Authority found irregularities in 27 out of the 28 foreign universities operating in Hungary, and 
this finding necessitated a change in the legislation. This logic is difficult to follow, since the law 
adopted has no causal relation to the administrative irregularities found. If a law is not complied 
with, the law should be enforced and not modified. Also, in the case of CEU the minor technical 
problems had already been corrected when the bill was tabled. Most universities are exempted 
from the rules, being accredited in EU countries. In any case, all the other foreign universities 
scrutinised by the Education Authority were little known with few of them offering 
comprehensive programmes, just a few courses. It is clear that the law is targeting CEU and 
CEU only. 
Whereas the biased nature of the law was at first denied, soon the impossibility that a US-
accredited university could fulfil the conditions was acknowledged by the Minister of Human 
Capacities who proposed the bill. The fact that the law targets CEU in a discriminatory manner 
was also admitted by the State Secretary for Education. That the intention of the ruling party is 
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to force CEU out of the country is thinly veiled, as tellingly reflected in the moniker ‘Lex CEU’ 
used by the media. 
1.2 The broader context of lawmaking in Hungary 
The saga of Lex CEU fits into a broader picture of lawmaking in the country. Instead of being 
based on the rule of law – in disregard of concepts such as legal certainty, foreseeability of laws, 
protection of acquired rights, prohibition of retroactive laws or human rights, for example – 
more often than not laws are passed with the exclusive aim of realising short-term political or 
financial profits. Instead of general norms, laws are tailored to advance individual persons’ or 
groups’ interests. We review a few cases below for purposes of illustration. 
Pál Schmitt, who served as President of Hungary from 2010 to 2012, had been extremely loyal 
to the government – not vetoing a single bill in Parliament – but his appointment was 
controversial in many respects. His CV, for example, suggests that he might have collaborated 
with the communist regime. So as to be on the safe side, Act CX of 2011 on the status and 
remuneration of the President was amended so that even if his office terminated prematurely 
for whatever reason, he received allowances for the rest of his life, was entitled to 
accommodation financed by the state and received other benefits. Ultimately, however, it was 
another part of his life that led to his resignation: it came to light that Schmitt plagiarised his 
PhD dissertation, which led to the withdrawal of his doctoral title, and after a lengthy 
controversy he was forced to resign. Nevertheless, the modified law on the remuneration of 
the President remained in effect. 
Another example is the data protection issue of the so-called social consultation initiated by 
the government. A letter including a list of questions on social issues was sent to all citizens 
having voting rights. The return form seemed to be anonymous at first sight, but there was a 
bar code on it, which enabled the reconstruction of the ties between the sheet and the 
respondent’s name, domicile and other personal data. After the data protection ombudsman 
stated the obvious, i.e. that the way the social consultation was conducted amounted to a 
violation of privacy, the Parliament passed a law – Act LX of 2012 modifying Act LXVI of 1992 
on keeping records on the personal data and address of citizens – to exempt such national 
consultations from the general data protection requirements. As a side-effect, the data 
protection ombudsman’s office was also prematurely terminated, which by the way was found 
to be in breach of EU law in a judgment by the Court of Justice of the European Union. . 
When Mr. Andy Vajna, film producer and Government Commissioner in charge of the 
Hungarian film industry, needed child actors for one of his movies, the Ministry of Human 
Capacity instructed the administration to find a legal solution. The modification to the child 
protection law to relax the rules on employing minors is said to now be finalised.  
Four years ago on a sunny spring day, the Prime Minister and the Mayor of the capital were 
driving through the streets of Budapest, when Mr Orbán noticed a small, pretty palace built 
towards the end of the 19th century, which used to house the Ballet Institute. “It is in Portugese 
hands” – the Mayor informed the Prime Minister. “I want it back” – responded the PM. “But 
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isn’t there some law that prevents this for 20 years?” – asked the Mayor. “Why don’t we make 
a new law? The city can propose it and I would make it a law.” – was the response. This 
conversation, which proves the Prime Minister’s total disregard for the rule of law, legal 
certainty and property rights, was filmed and the video clip became public. In a dictatorship, 
there would be retaliation against those who disclose such materials. In a democracy, the 
politicians involved would need to resign. In Hungary, which is somewhere in-between, the 
story had no consequences whatsoever for any of the parties involved. 
Even the constitution was abused to serve short-term political interests. Whenever the 
Constitutional Court declared certain laws unconstitutional – such as the Parliament’s 
discretionary powers to grant religious organisations the official status of a church, or the quasi 
criminalisation of homelessness – the invalidated provisions were entrenched into Hungary’s 
constitution, the Fundamental Law, in order to place them beyond the reach of the 
Constitutional Court for the future. Basis on the constitutional authorisation, the problematic 
laws were readopted, often including more rights infringements than before they had been 
quashed by the Constitutional Court. The Prime Minister’s quote “our lawyers will fix it” became 
a bon mot describing the government’s misinterpretation of the rule of law as rule by law, law 
by rule.  
Lex CEU fits into this disturbing trend of case-by-case lawmaking influenced by political bias. It 
also fits into another trend I label the selection of worst practices. A certain tension can be 
traced in national pride ignoring foreign standards and at the same time justifying national 
solutions by way of international examples. Foreign laws are studied in a search for the most 
rights restrictive legal solutions and those providing the least or no checks on the majority rule 
will be borrowed by the Hungarian lawmaker. Should the model norm stem from a democratic 
jurisdiction, the foreign example will be expressly referenced, as a justification for its insertion 
into the Hungarian legal system.  
These norms, procedures and institutions are often taken out of context. International 
examples were referenced when the minimum age of criminal culpability was lowered, or when 
the powers of the Constitutional Court were cut back. Whereas some jurisdictions indeed have 
a very low age of criminal liability, the conviction of a minor might have very different 
consequences in one state compared to another. Similarly, whereas there exist democratic 
countries without a constitutional court, other checks are incorporated into their legal systems. 
But these contexts are disregarded.  
If the model norm stems from a jurisdiction that is at odds with democracy, the practice is 
appropriated without making reference to its origin. The model for Lex CEU originates from 
Russia, where the European University at St. Petersburg is experiencing a similar pattern 
harassment. The latter institution is currently fighting an arbitration court’s decision to have its 
license revoked.  
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1.3 The legislative procedure 
It all happened very fast. Lex CEU was pushed through in one week. Media close to the 
governing party raised the question whether CEU could remain in Budapest in December, but 
pushing the university out of the country did not seem to be a real option. On March 28th, 
however, the draft law was disclosed by the media. 
International and domestic reactions were immediate and very supportive of CEU. As 
graphically depicted in the map above, some 40,000 individuals signed a petition to save CEU 
from all over the world. 
Close to 100,000 individuals – from Noam Chomsky to John Malkovich – and distinguished think 
tanks and academic entities – from CEPS to the Max Planck Society, from Harvard to Oxford, 
from Princeton to the Polish Academy of Sciences – showed their solidarity and objected to the 
bill in one form or another. Academics asked the government in the strongest possible terms 
to withdraw the draft law. Thousands petitioned the Parliament, or called upon their EP 
representatives to speak up against the closure of CEU. Hungarian intellectuals (individually and 
in groups), the world’s leading universities, an ex-President of Hungary, the Hungarian Academy 
of Sciences all joined the critiques of the government’s moves against CEU.  
Signatories of the petition supporting CEU 
 
Source: Google maps  
On April 2nd, a demonstration took place in Budapest with 10,000 participants, and people in 
foreign countries also exercised their right to protest, typically in front of Hungarian assemblies. 
Michael Ignatieff, President and Rector of CEU declared: “In a week, CEU has become the 
symbol of academic freedom in the world.” But all this seems to have had no effect on those in 
power.  
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On April 3rd, Parliament agreed to adopt Lex CEU in an extraordinary, accelerated and simplified 
procedure, and modifications of the bill were tabled with even more punitive provisions and 
stricter deadlines for CEU. The law was adopted the next day, against the strong criticism of the 
democratic opposition parties and amidst demonstrations around CEU. The Prime Minister 
made it clear before the voting that he expects all Fidesz and Christian Democratic coalition 
party MPs to vote in favour of the bill. It is important to emphasise this point, since some 
conservative public figures including Fidesz politicians voiced their concerns about the attacks 
on academic freedom. The law was adopted with 123 votes for and 38 against. Complying with 
the instructions of the Prime Minister, all MPs from governing parties voted in favour of the 
law, whereas all opposition party members present voted against it. 
CEU contested the constitutionality of the law and asked the President not to sign it. Indeed, 
President János Áder could have made use of a presidential veto or could have sent the law to 
the Constitutional Court for ex-ante review. Academic freedom as guaranteed in Article X of 
the Fundamental Law was hampered by subjecting the operation of a university to political 
discretion, and to an impossible condition. Furthermore, it has been unnecessarily and 
disproportionately limited by requiring a US-accredited and Hungary-based university to open 
a US campus. The discriminatory nature of the law targeting CEU only is a violation of the 
principle of non-discrimination as provided for in Article XV, and the extremely short 
preparation period for complying with the law is a violation of foreseeability and legal certainty. 
Violations of procedural rules during the law-making procedure have also been challenged. 
On April 9th, demonstrations took place in both Berlin and Budapest pushing the President not 
to sign the law. Some 80,000 people marched in the Hungarian capital from the Buda side of 
the Danube to the Pest side, making it the largest demonstration since the current Fidesz 
government entered power in 2010. Upon reaching CEU’s campus, the crowd stopped and 
burst out in applause. The march ended in front of the Parliament, where the demonstration’s 
anti-government and pro-EU message came to the forefront. 
Despite these actions, the President’s legal team was not concerned and a few hours before 
the deadline on April 10th he signed the bill adopted by Parliament into law. A spontaneous 
demonstration took place the same night before the President’s residence.  
CEU has to comply with the law by 5 September 2017, whose requirements are close to 
impossible to fulfil for the reasons detailed above. If CEU ceased to exist, Közép-Európai 
Egyetem, the Hungarian-accredited entity, could continue its operation, but it is easy to see 
that students find an American degree more valuable than a Hungarian one, and this may have 
an enormous effect on potential future applicants, who might opt to attend Western 
universities instead. What is more, two-thirds of CEU’s programmes are not accredited in 
Hungary (only 3 out of 13 doctoral programmes are accredited, and 8 out of 20 MA 
programmes, not counting the specialisations.) The Legal Studies Department would, for 
example, entirely cease to exist since Hungarian accreditation is impossible for law 
programmes. It is not that CEU does not meet the quality requirements, but rather because of 
the specific nature of the discipline: a legal studies programme can only be accredited in 
THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES: ATTACKS AGAINST CEU | 7 
 
Hungary if the law school offers undergraduate degrees, whereas CEU is a post-graduate 
university only. But even if an exception was made, it does not make much sense to teach 
national substantive and procedural laws in a university with an international student body. All 
in all, depriving the university of the possibility to offer a US degree is highly likely to have fatal 
consequences for CEU.  
2. WHY? Possible state objectives behind Lex CEU 
Today close to 450 professors from some 50 countries teach 1,800 students from 120 countries 
at CEU. It is considered to be one of the most prestigious universities in Central and Eastern 
Europe for 25 years now. It has a high academic reputation, ranking 39th among the best young 
universities (below 50 years of age) worldwide and 16th among BRICS and emerging economies’ 
university rankings, according to Times Higher Education. It is very influential in the region and 
beyond, attracts consumers and tourists, pays high taxes and employs hundreds of Hungarian 
citizens. So why would any politician wish to drive it out of the country?  
2.1 Eliminating dissent 
The first and most obvious supposition is that the Fidesz government wishes to eliminate all 
forms of dissent. In a country based on the rule of law, built-in correction mechanisms 
compensate for the deficiencies of a majoritarian government: the doctrines of separation of 
powers, checks and balances, constitutional scrutiny, judicial oversight, media pluralism and a 
robust civil society all make sure that those in power do not abuse power. These institutions 
and procedures are all tools of militant democracy, operating along the paranoid logic of 
constitutional law inserting precautionary measures into democratic systems to protect them 
against a future potential government acquiring and retaining powers at all costs, i.e. by super-
seeding constitutional government by emotional government.1 
Domestic tools of militant democracy have failed, however, and all elements of a constitutional 
rule of law have been jeopardised in Hungary.  
The Hungarian Fundamental Law of 2011 and the constitutionally relevant cardinal laws were 
used as tools in dismantling checks on the government, which in Hungary is a majoritarian 
unicameral Parliament. Act XXXVI of 2013 on elections introduced a one-step system instead 
of a two-step election procedure and changed the rules of compensation so that it benefits the 
winner. Constitutional changes extending citizenship to Hungarians living in neighbouring 
countries in combination with the gerrymandered districts add up to an election system 
benefiting those in power. Even the thinnest understanding of the rule of law requiring only 
that regular free and democratic elections are held, is hampered, after the introduction of a 
new election law. As Transparency International noted, elections in Hungary are free, but not 
fair.  
                                                     
1 See Petra Bárd, Sergio Carrera, Elspeth Guild and Dimitry Kochenov, “An EU Mechanism on Democracy, the Rule 
of Law and Fundamental Rights”, CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe, CEPS, Brussels, April 2016. 
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The independence of the ordinary judiciary has been compromised in numerous ways. By 
introducing new age limits for retirement with immediate effect, 27% of Supreme Court judges 
and more than 50% of appeals court presidents were removed, and the positions were filled by 
lawyers loyal to the government. The then-President of the Supreme Court was 59 years old at 
the material time when he was removed from office via a different means. He was elected for 
six years in the summer of 2009, but in the meantime in December 2011 a cardinal law, Act 
CLXI of 2011 on the structure and operation of the judiciary, was passed. According to a new 
rule, only persons with five years’ experience in the national judiciary can qualify as President 
of the Supreme Court, a requirement not met by the then President who was therefore 
removed with immediate effect after the entry into force of the law. The 16 years he spent as 
the Hungarian judge on the European Court of Human Rights did not qualify him under the new 
law to serve his mandate. This controversy resulted in a court ruling that Hungary was in 
violation of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 
At the same time, the system of judicial self-government was replaced by a novel institution 
called the National Judicial Office (NJO). Its President, elected by two-thirds majority of 
Parliament, has comprehensive powers to employ, promote and sanction judges and to 
relocate cases. The Venice Commission, the EU and the US State Department have all voiced 
concerns over the NJO, especially its President’s powers. 
Since 2010, the power and independence of the Hungarian Constitutional Court (HCC) have 
been diminished. The Fundamental Law extended the number of judges on the HCC from 11 to 
15 and changed their mandate from 9 years to 12 years. (Article 24 Section (8)) The majority of 
the justices are nominees of the current government and their mandates are overarching 
several future parliamentary elections. The HCC was deprived of its power to review actio 
popularis petitions, i.e. requests that anyone could file irrespective of whether they or anyone 
else had a related case or controversy. According to the Fundamental Law, individuals may file 
constitutional complaints only if they are concretely injured by the application of a seemingly 
unconstitutional law and have at the same time exhausted all remedies in ordinary courts 
(Article 24 Section (2) Points c)-d)), or if the judge of an ordinary court refers a constitutional 
issue in an ongoing case to the HCC (Article 24 Section (2) Point b) FL). The Fourth Amendment 
deprived the HCC the right to declare a constitutional amendment unconstitutional on 
substantive grounds (Article 24 Section (5)) and overruling a previous HCC decision, it also 
repealed all previous HCC decisions (Point 5 of the Closing Provisions). 
The ombudsman system with one general and several specialised parliamentary 
representatives for various human rights ceased to exist, but the portfolios continued to be 
assigned to deputy ombudsmen. The only specialised ombudsman whose position ceased to 
exist entirely was the one responsible for data protection. His office was shifted directly into 
the government in the form of the Hungarian National Authority for Data Protection and 
Freedom of Information. The premature abolition of the office before the expiry of the data 
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protection ombudsman’s mandate with special regard to the independence of the institution 
was subject to review by the CJEU, and Hungary was found to be in violation of EU law. 
In an attempt to create a body of civil servants and government officials loyal to the 
government, Act CLXXIV of 2010 amended Act XXIII of 1992 on the legal status of public officials, 
enabling employers to terminate the employment relationship of public servants, with only two 
months’ notice, without a just cause. In its decision 29/2011. (IV. 7.), the HCC invalidated the 
law and according to the reintroduced provisions, employers are obliged to give a realistic and 
lawful reason for dismissal, but still, according to Act CXCIX of 2011 on public service officials, 
loss of trust and unworthiness – rather vague terms that can easily be abused – can be cited as 
causes for dismissal. 
Unorthodox Hungarian fiscal policies included nationalising private pension funds, introducing 
special taxes on the banking, telecoms, energy and retailing sectors, and extending the powers 
of the President of the Hungarian Central Bank under the guidance of the Minister of Economy, 
who later moved into this position himself. The Hungarian Central Bank’s independence is being 
closely monitored and is frequently the subject of criticism in the international arena. 
Curtailment of media diversity as a powerful means of formulating and disseminating dissenting 
views is among the best-documented steps in diminishing external criticism against 
government policies. In the past year, a quasi-war has been conducted against civil society – 
mainly human rights – organisations, subjecting them to extraordinary tax procedures. 
Although the authorities did not find any irregularities, just before Christmas in 2016, hostility 
against NGOs reached its peak when the Prime Minister predicted that NGOs, especially those 
funded by George Soros and his foundations, will be “swept out” of the country in the coming 
year. 
In a country with no institutions and hardly any individuals able to express criticism of the 
government, academic researchers and lecturers at CEU are among the few who are still can 
voice dissent. Not only are they intellectually capable of doing so, but they also are not 
dependent on government money, unlike their colleagues at state research centres and 
universities. 
2.2 Attracting far-right voters 
The second supposition why a politician would launch these attacks against CEU is that they 
might succeed in attracting far-right wing Jobbik voters, for which the anti-Semitic overtones 
of attacking Mr Soros and Soros-funded entities provides an ideal tool. Government politicians 
may also wish to test the reaction of undecided voters (right column in the figure below), who 
will play a major role in the upcoming 2018 elections. 
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Voter preferences in Hungary in February 2017 
 
Source: http://kozvelemenykutatok.hu/ 
2.3 Ideological differences 
A third possible explanation traces the events back to the government’s ideological roots. CEU 
and its founder Mr Soros represent everything the government is fighting against or is 
suspicious of, such as the rule of law, fundamental rights, multiculturalism, tolerance, 
accountable government, transparency, justice, equality, liberal democracy and open society. 
Students are encouraged to engage in independent critical thinking, to stand by their ideals and 
change the world. As Mr Soros says in his autobiography Soros on Soros: Karl Popper, author of 
The Open Society and its Enemies influenced him with his writings and his thinking in the fight 
for democracy. It is in this spirit that Mr Soros established the Open Society Foundations – also 
present in Budapest, with an annual budget of around €800 million – funding projects 
defending among others the rights of vulnerable communities, assisting the democratic 
development of the countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union and advancing 
the rights of Roma communities in Europe. It is in this spirit that CEU was founded, and this is 
the spirit disliked by the Hungarian government.  
Not that the governing party follows a clear ideological line. Fidesz was originally a party 
contributing to the regime change and a great supporter of the idea of liberal democracy. The 
Prime Minister and many other Fidesz politicians received Soros scholarships, which enabled 
them to study abroad. While originally adhering to the liberal tradition, Fidesz slowly turned 
into a conservative party – but that does not explain its abandoning the path of the rule of law. 
The way the party operates becomes clearer if one realises that the shift to conservativism was 
not the result of a thoroughly discussed change in the ideals of party members. Rather, it was 
triggered solely by an opening in the political arena, which the party opportunistically moved 
quickly to fill. Other moves by the ruling party have also been pragmatic, targeted and informed 
by a desire to acquire and retain political and financial power at all costs. But this desire fits ill 
with the concept of checks and balances, rule of law and democracy, obliging the government 
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to turn towards illiberalism and like-minded powers. This explains why Fidesz’s strong anti-
Russian sentiments vanished and why Mr Putin turned into one of Hungary’s main allies.  
2.4 Ties to the US 
In a fourth attempt to explain the attack on CEU, some contend that the government wishes to 
force the US to engage in a dialogue with Hungary. When President Trump came to power, 
Prime Minister Orbán interpreted this as “an authorisation from the highest secular place that 
we are free to put ourselves at the head of the line so that national interest will be at the 
forefront”. Expectations were high: Mr Orbán also hoped to find an ally for his illiberal policies 
in the new US administration. But President Trump could not care less about Hungary. 
Satisfying its Machtwahn – some Hungarians speculate – the Fidesz government may now see 
a chance in opening up negotiations with the US under the pretext of discussing the presence 
of CEU in Hungary.  
A related, but more convincing explanation suggests that Fidesz would like to test President 
Trump’s approach towards Mr Soros. So far the plan seems to be ill suited, as the US interpreted 
the case as an issue involving academic freedom. The Chargé d’Affaires of the US Embassy in 
Budapest has issued a statement in support of CEU, the Acting Spokesperson at the US 
Department of State voiced US concerns and US Senator Ben Cardin, Ranking Member of the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, also spoke out in support of CEU. Instead of responding 
to these reactions in a meaningful manner, the government decided to recall the Hungarian 
ambassador in Washington, since – in the eyes of the government – she failed to satisfactorily 
explain the legitimacy, neutrality and indiscriminate nature of Lex CEU to the State Department 
– a tall order to fulfil indeed.  
3. HOW? How was support for Lex CEU generated? 
3.1 Alternative facts aka lies 
Support for the law was created by relying on ‘alternative facts’, to use a fashionable 
euphemism, and by suggesting that CEU and its spirit undermine Hungary’s national interests, 
and possibly also national security. 
The government contended that the university was in breach of the law, whereas only 
administrative mistakes were found by the Educational Authority, but even those were already 
being corrected. The Prime Minister accused CEU of fraudulent conduct, of “cheating” for not 
complying with the law that the Parliament was about to adopt (cf. the prohibition of 
retroactive laws). Fidesz’s parliamentary faction leader labelled CEU a phantom university, 
“with two secretaries sitting under a CEU sign somewhere in New York”. This indeed is difficult 
to interpret. CEU does not have an office in New York and never claimed it had one.  
As it is well known, CEU is a Budapest-based university accredited in the US. There is nothing 
peculiar about it. Just like the American University in Cairo, the American University of Paris, 
the American University in Bulgaria, the American University of Bosnia Herzegovina, the 
American University of Central Asia, the American University in the Emirates, etc. do not have 
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campuses in the US, CEU does not have one either. The fact that CEU does not have a US base 
does not jeopardise its academic excellence in any way. On the contrary, it is well documented 
that the university is by far the most prestigious institute of higher education in the country. 
Other strategies can be deduced from the terminology used. The government knows well that 
words matter. State-captured media sources consequently refer to CEU as an “elitist 
university”, which plays on people’s envy and jealousy by suggesting that only a small segment 
of society has a chance to be enrolled. The allegation that CEU is isolated from Hungarian 
academic life could not be further from the truth. Anyone with even a little familiarity with the 
Hungarian situation will know that CEU is well integrated into the country’s system of higher 
education.  
The university has played a major role in establishing ties between the Hungarian academic 
community and the rest of the world. It has the richest library in Hungary, which is accessible 
to anyone, not just the CEU community. Furthermore, the university organises several public 
lectures, seminars and conferences each week, which anyone can attend and benefit from 
listening to leading scholars from across the globe. Grants and scholarships offered to Central 
Eastern European students make it possible for anyone – meeting academic standards and 
speaking sufficient English – to enroll.  
Another allegation is that CEU presents comparative disadvantages for other Hungarian 
universities by offering two degrees. But the truth is that the university went through very 
demanding accreditation procedures, and the students who earn double degrees have to 
perform extra tasks. The floor is open: any university is free to have its programme accredited 
in another country, if it can meet the requirements. From the inflowing letters of solidarity it is 
clear that Hungarian intellectuals did not fall for this technique of “divide and conquer”. 
The suggestion that a lesser share of state funds is available to Hungarian universities due to 
CEU’s presence is also a lie. CEU is not a beneficiary of any Hungarian state funds. On the 
contrary, CEU annually pays millions of euros in taxes and employs more than 1,200 individuals, 
including hundreds of Hungarians. Neither is it true that the university’s financial status was 
not transparent. Unlike many state-funded Hungarian higher educational facilities, CEU makes 
all its finances public.  
3.2 Lies continued: CEU as a threat to national identity and national security 
An alternative denomination for CEU is “Soros University” suggesting that Mr Soros influences 
the curriculum. This again is a false statement: the founder made it clear from the very 
beginning that he does not wish to influence the operation of CEU in any way. The faculty is 
responsible to the Board of Trustees consisting of distinguished scholars from UC Berkeley, 
Columbia, Harvard, Oxford and UC Stanford, inter alia. 
Fidesz-member MPs went one step further claiming that CEU was a politically-biased military 
academy, whose aim is among others to undermine government policies. It is alleged that the 
political bias of pushing through a liberal agenda is proven by the existence of CEU’s Gender 
Studies Department. The charge of course is nonsensical: CEU is an independent academic 
THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES: ATTACKS AGAINST CEU | 13 
 
organisation, having undergone the most stringent accreditation procedures in two countries, 
and with a faculty of highly respected and renown professors from all over the world.  
Anti-Soros sentiments are disguised in the form of national identity, which currently includes 
anti-Western, anti-European and anti-Brussels sentiments. Lex CEU fits into a broader agenda 
of fighting against anyone still capable of voicing dissent. In the domestic setting – beyond CEU 
– there still are some civil society organisations that can formulate government criticism, not 
least because they receive Soros funds. A law will be adopted against them in the coming days. 
According to the bill, any association or foundation receiving foreign support above the amount 
of €23,200 will have to notify the courts. EU money is exempted, but only if it is distributed by 
the Hungarian state through a budgetary institution. The organisation receiving foreign money 
will be labelled as a “organization supported from abroad”, which must be indicated on the 
entity’s website, press releases, publications, etc. Organisations shall retain that status for five 
years following the termination of foreign financial support.  
The bill is problematic in many aspects: it mimics Russia’s worst practices, which have been 
condemned by international organisations as violations of freedom of association and free 
speech. It sends the message that NGOs are somehow non-transparent or are in the service of 
foreign government interests. The law may lead to the shutting down of several NGOs that do 
not wish to be so-labelled, or whose funders do not wish to continue to support them. Since 
Hungary is not known for having a culture of philanthropy, this will mean that only NGOs 
dependent on state money will survive, and the opinions of all the others will be dismissed as 
serving foreign interests.  
The government’s tactic of labelling Mr Soros, the CEU faculty and NGO representatives – 
virtually anyone still capable of formulating dissent in Hungary – as foreign agents was recently 
taken to a whole new level: these individuals and entities are said to pose a national security 
threat to the country. This is getting very close to demonising dissenters as terrorists and 
indeed the government claims that NGOs receiving foreign support – i.e. the most professional 
ones – are helping asylum seekers, and among them terrorists, enter the country. The 
explanations of both the draft law on civil society organisations and Lex CEU refer to the 
protection of national security among the objectives of the norms. This by the way is a smart 
move from a legal point of view, and can serve (i.e. be abused) as the basis for lobbying for 
exemptions from European standards.  
4. WHAT WILL HAPPEN NEXT?  
4.1 Possible future scenarios 
At the time of writing, demonstrations continue to be staged in Budapest and elsewhere in 
Europe. ELTE Law School in Budapest has cancelled classes and has organised a conference on 
academic freedom and Lex CEU. Regardless of the subjects they are teaching, professors are 
devoting time to discussing the concepts of democracy and the rule of law with their students. 
Some are even refusing to lecture until Lex CEU is withdrawn. The democratic opposition plans 
to initiate a referendum against the law (and against a third renewal of the Prime Minister’s 
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position, thereby preventing both current PM Viktor Orbán and former Socialist PM Ferenc 
Gyurcsány from holding this office after the next elections).  
Protesters in front of CEU after the controversial law was adopted 
 
Source: Edit Kalman Photography.  
CEU leadership have made it clear that they intend to fight for the continued operation of the 
university in Budapest and seek all available legal remedies – request the President not to sign 
the law, initiate constitutional review, and if need be, will turn to ordinary courts, the 
Constitutional Court, EU institutions and the European Court of Human Rights. They have 
expressed a strong commitment to Hungary and to remaining in Budapest.  
But if the international agreement requested by Lex CEU does not come into being, and it is 
impossible for CEU to continue its operations in the Hungarian capital, it will most likely move. 
Any Central and Eastern European state would welcome the university – Vilnius, Słupsk and 
Vienna have already invited CEU to their towns. The loss would therefore fall far more heavily 
on Budapest and on Hungarian academic life than on CEU. Not only are CEU faculty members 
not foreign agents or threats to national security, but it is a vital national interest for the 
university to stay, prosper and enhance the reputation of the Hungarian capital and its 
academic life.  
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4.2 Lessons learned  
There are two lessons to be drawn from the unhappy experience of Lex CEU. Even though the 
law is a clear attack on academic freedom, excellence and knowledge in general, its implications 
are much broader. At the same time, it also goes way beyond a Kulturkampf of defending or 
destroying liberal values. Ultimately, the attack against CEU is an attack on the rule of law. 
The case of Lex CEU is not solely an issue of national academic freedom. Dismantling the rule 
of law and committing mass violations of fundamental rights have overarching consequences 
for the EU as well. Beyond harming the nationals of a member state, Union citizens residing in 
that state will also be detrimentally affected by national government policies. Moreover, all EU 
citizens will to some extent suffer due to the given state’s participation in the EU’s decision-
making mechanisms, or at the very least the legitimacy of the Union’s decision-making process 
will be jeopardised.  
Thus, a state’s departure from the rule-of-law standards and the European consensus will 
ultimately hamper the exercise of rights of individuals EU-wide. A weak response to illiberal 
practices may also encourage other member state governments to follow suit, and subject 
other countries’ citizens to an abuse of their rights. In other words, violations of the rule of law 
may, if there are no consequences, become contagious.  
Autocratic techniques spread rapidly: Hungarians copied a Russian policy employed vis-à-vis 
the European University at St. Petersburg and just a few days after Lex CEU had been proposed, 
former Romanian Prime Minister Victor Ponta expressed his enthusiasm for the Hungarian law. 
Mr Ponta, now an MP in the Romanian Chamber of Deputies, intends to propose a similar law, 
in order to restrict the activities of foreign universities in his country. This is a hardly hidden 
attack on two Hungarian state-funded universities: the Sapientia Hungarian University of 
Transylvania and the Partium Christian University.  
So, who is violating national interests after all? Ironically, Fidesz’s moves against CEU may 
indirectly pave the way allowing the harassment of the Hungarian minority in Romania, in 
contradiction of the government’s insistence that the protection of national minorities outside 
the borders of Hungary ranks high on its agenda.  
If properly constructed, the case of CEU is not about liberal values either, but rather about 
liberal democracy. An important aspect of the storyline is that several Hungarian conservative 
intellectuals recognised this and stood up for CEU. Academic freedom, freedom of expression, 
human rights and the rule of law in general are not some kind of a liberal agenda, these are 
European values, irrespective of one’s political party preferences.  
4.3 The responsibility of European institutions 
It is high time for the EU to acknowledge its vital importance and act accordingly, and for the 
European institutions to employ diplomatic and legal sanctions against those undermining EU 
foundations. As German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier said to the European Parliament: 
“…if we want to be a lighthouse in the world for the rule of law and for human rights, then we 
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cannot ignore when these foundations are shaken... Europe, then, must not be silent, when 
civil society, even academia – as now at Central European University in Budapest – are deprived 
of the air to breathe.”  
The statement by Carlos Moedas, European Commissioner for Research, Science and 
Innovation concerning lex CEU – backed up by First Vice-President Frans Timmermans – is also 
promising, but far more than a “full and thorough analysis of this law” is called for under the 
present circumstances. Previous diplomatic statements, threats to use Article 7 TEU or the 
Tavares report have all remained without serious consequence. The controversy about CEU 
also shows how little influence mere words exert on the government. Its sole reaction was to 
claim that everyone showing support for the university and criticising the government – from 
the most distinguished scholars in the world, including 20 Nobel prize laureates, to the 
European People’s Party, Fidesz’s own party family in the European Parliament – were “gravely 
mislead (sic) by the propaganda and private agenda of the American billionaire Soros”. 
The logic that it is better to have the black sheep inside the flock rather than outside has 
informed EU policy for too long. The past seven years have proved this approach to be 
dysfunctional. The reasoning that the EU sanctioning a member state – by making use of Article 
7 TEU, for example – may have the opposite effect and be exploited by stirring up anti-EU 
sentiment is not convincing either. Brussels has already been used as a convenient scapegoat 
in too many instances, and stepping outside the EU will in any event be on the agenda once 
Hungary ceases to be a net beneficiary. In the meantime, an autocratic regime is being built 
with EU money.  
It is inconceivable why the EU refrains from firmly standing up for its own values, and in one 
way or another making use of the power of the purse – the only convincing tool available to it 
for disciplining an illiberal government of a net beneficiary country. Commissioner Günther 
Oettinger presented a response in the form of a conspiracy theory, suggesting that it is not in 
the interest of EU member states to employ financial sanctions against rule-of-law violators. He 
contended that it is ultimately Germany that benefits from EU money pouring into Central 
European member states, and therefore it was rather ambiguous which country was a net 
beneficiary and which one was a contributor to the EU budget. Should Hungary – or Poland for 
that matter – be sanctioned, it would hit German companies at the end of the day. Fidesz 
leaders also followed this same line of reasoning (i.e. that financial benefits to Hungary are 
lower than what the numbers actually show) paving the way for secession.  
In a country where domestic checks have failed, the only control mechanism left is the resort 
to international law, including international courts protecting the rule of law. Accordingly, both 
EU and Council of Europe tools to enforce the rule of law and fundamental rights play a pivotal 
role. It therefore will come as no surprise that the Hungarian government is attacking both 
entities. Simultaneously with submitting the draft for Lex CEU and the bill attacking civil society 
organisations, in the zeal of the upcoming elections the government initiated a national 
consultation “to stop Brussels” from intruding into Hungarian national affairs. 
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At about this same time, the European Court of Human Rights declared Hungary’s refugee 
policy – or, more precisely, its incarceration of asylum seekers in so-called transit zones – to be 
contrary to the European Convention on Human Rights. Forces close to the government and 
politicians, including the Prime Minister, reacted rather hysterically in interpreting the 
judgment as an attempt by the ECtHR to prevent Hungary from efficiently protecting its borders 
and citizens. They advised the government to appeal the judgment and if appeal was not 
successful (which is highly likely), not to enforce the judgment to take measures to derogate 
from Hungary’s obligations under the Convention and should all the above prove to be 
unsuccessful, they suggested that – in an unprecedented move – Hungary should step out of 
the Convention.  
This is more political rhetoric than a viable option, but it is not without precedent. In 2015, the 
Prime Minister fantasised about reintroducing the death penalty, which would also inevitably 
lead to Hungary opting out of the Convention. Even though such ideas are certainly nonsense 
and are probably not even taken seriously by those who express them, they are a worrying 
trend. Whereas a majority of Hungarians are still pro-European, questioning foundational 
European values and interpreting human rights mechanisms by the established European 
courts as an attack on national sovereignty, may easily shift public sentiment towards 
secession.  
This is a disturbing suggestion, which automatically calls into question Hungary’s European 
Union membership as well, since ratification of the Convention and Council of Europe 
membership are prerequisites of EU accession. Seceding from these European organisations 
would also mean leaving Hungarian citizens and legal persons without an external rule of law 
and fundamental rights supervisory mechanism. These external mechanisms are currently the 
only robust and efficient ones remaining in the country, where domestic channels of rights 
protection are already captured by an illiberal state. 
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